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1. Introduction 
 
This paper intends to show some of the complex relations between institutions and 
industrial policies. Owing to the fact that institutions are important factors in determining 
the slow pace of change of societies, their economies, states and private sectors, they 
therefore present important consequences for the design of industrial policies (which are 
also, one must underline, institutions). Thus, the paper tries to expose the relevance of the 
institutionality of a country for the choice of industrial policies and for their possibilities of 
success. 
However, looking at the matter from the opposite angle, one important focus for 
many industrial policies are institutional changes, whether these institutions are connected 
to the State (and so, are more directly related to the implementation of industrial policies), 
to the relationship between the State and the private sector, only to the latter sector, or even 
consist of institutions that pervade the entire society. That is, the State, whether with firm 
foundations or otherwise (Chang, 1994a:70-1; 1994b:299) may desire to change a great 
number of institutions in certain sectors of society, or even those that pervade the whole 
society, in its intention to create what it considers an adequate institutionality which will be 
able to implement certain industrial policies. Of course this does not mean that the State is 
necessarily right in its intention to transform these institutions or that it will be able to 
realise such a desire. But simply that the State can try to make such changes, with the 
effective and full results of those actions only known ex-post. 
The article contains four additional sections: in the following one, I better define the 
concepts of institutions and industrial policies. In the third section, I investigate the 
repercussions of institutions on the elaboration and execution of industrial policies. In the 
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fourth, I analyse the situation from an opposing perspective, i.e., I discuss the means 
through which industrial policies influence institutional changes. Finally, I present some 
brief conclusions. 
 
2. Some Important Definitions 
 
Institutions are defined as rules and patterns of behaviour or interaction among 
people verified in one (or part of a) society, rules and patterns of behaviour which must 
acquire some stability, i.e., need to be repeated,  even  for  a  short  time  span.  That  is, 
institutions set up and, at the same time, restrict, the choices of individuals, at least in terms 
of what is socially recognised or considered acceptable and/or rational. Of course this does 
not mean that these individuals must be conscious of these norms and rules, or of their 
meaning or function.1 Institutions reflect and, at the same time, settle, the value structure of 
societies.2 And, therefore, they prescribe the expected behaviour and performance of some 
social functions and situations, and also determine – together with some ways of rewarding 
and creating incentives,3 and with sanctions against deviating behaviours – the motivations4 
for and the level of confidence that one can have in this behaviour and performance. 
 
 
1  Hall (1986:19); Elster (1989:99). Elster shows that social norms need to be shared by some (or many) 
people. Johnson (1992:26) includes among institutions the habits, routines, rules, norms and laws, as well as 
the organisations. I include communication between people in these patterns and rules of behaviour and 
interaction: As explained by Tool (1990:166): “Socially correlated patterns of behaviour are internalised by 
individuals and become habitual. Institutions, then, are made up of habits but they are not determined by 
habits. Being constituted of habits, institutions are often resistant to change. Rules, codes, customs, and 
attitudes, once established and embedded as habits, define expected behaviour and are presumed  to be 
continuing.” See also North (1990:4; 1991; 1994); Landesmann & Pagano (1994:199); Langlois (1986a:17; 
1986b); Akerlof (1976:24) and Popper (1963:149-52). 
2 Tool (1990:166). See also DiMaggio & Powell (1991a) for the visions and importance of values for Parsons 
and Bourdieu. For these authors, values are set before institutionalisation, i.e., they are preconditions to 
institutionalisation. 
3 Popper (1963:156); Rizzo (1985:881-2); Elster (1989:99-100). That is why I prefer to define institutions as 
patterns of behaviour and not as rules which define or impose them, as, for instance, in North (1990:3). For 
rewards, despite the fact that they may be established by rules (at least in the majority of cases), can hardly be 
seen as restrictions. 
4 Granovetter (1985); North (1990; 1991). In this definition of institutions I do not include ideologies, as, for 
instance,  in  Veblen  (1899:110), or  in  some  other  important  contemporary  institutionalists (Friedland  & 
Alford, 1991:243; Johnson, 1992:27-8). This does not mean that “mental habits” or the ideas of different 
individuals do not acquire some stability and routine characteristics — historically, culturally or personally 
determined — which cannot be included in a definition of institutions. The objection is to overburden this 
concept with the one of ideology, for ideologies, in spite of some collective aspects that they hold, have a 
marked individual nature, which escape the definition of institutions presented before. I define ideology as the 
way through which a person tries to explain “the world” as a whole, understood as everything which enters 
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On the other hand, I consider industrial policy as every policy directed specifically 
to an industrial and/or service sector (given the increasing interrelationship among these 
sectors),5 and also to the industrial share of the agribusiness (while excluding the activities 
that can be easily classified as belonging mainly to the primary sector). Such a broad 
concept can be defended in spite of the fact that the industrial sector, in the majority, is not 
the one with the greatest share of the GNP in the most developed nations (Strachman, 
2000:67). For in these economies, as is well known, the share of the industrial sector has 
been increasingly surpassed by that of the service sector. However, this does not prevent 
the industrial sector from commanding all the productive logic of society, through its 
relations with other sectors. That is to say, the industrial sector, in great measure, directs 
these other economic sectors and is responsible for a great share of their (and of the 
societies as a whole) economic growth and technological dynamism (Cohen & Zysman, 
1987; Borrus & Zysman, 1992:23). This is evidenced by the (sometimes ill-considered) 
acceptance of the logic, structure and/or procedures adopted in manufacturing and/or in 
private enterprises by sectors with little (or practically no) relation to the aforementioned, 
e.g. education, health, government, etc.6 
Industrial policies should, then, be defined broadly, in order to include in their scope 
 
all those policies which are directed to the industrial sector, to the service segments directed 
to the industrial sector and also to the agro-industrial segments of the primary sector, 
whether on the supply or on the demand side. In this sense, the concept of industrial policies 
should also include the “industrial side” of the so-called agribusiness (but should exclude 
the activities that can be more easily classified as belonging to the primary sector as, for 
instance, “traditional” crop growing or cattle breeding), despite the ever increasing 
difficulties of separating what is agribusiness and what is industry, at least in the most 
modern sectors of the agribusiness, because of their growing connections with industry 
(Silva, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
his/her field of perception, or on which he/she reflects (in this case it can surely also include things that do not 
exist). In a similar sense, cf. North (1990:16-23,137-8) and Fligstein (1991). See also Vasconcelos et alii 
(1999). 
5 Adams & Bollino (1983); Fajnzylber (1983), Chang (1994a:56-58) and Thurow (1992). 
6   Fajnzylber  (1983);  Meyer  &  Rowan  (1991:55-6);  DiMaggio  &  Powell  (1991b:70);  Dosi  &  Kogut 
(1993:249-53). 
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Thus, I exclude macroeconomic policies, those that are most clearly directed to the 
agribusiness,  and  the  social  and  regional  policies  (when  not  primarily  connected  to 
industry) from this definition of industrial policy, in spite of the impacts of all of them on 
industrial policies, and vice-versa (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993:13). This exclusion is to 
avoid transforming this definition into a catch-all term (Chang, 1994a:59-61), that would 
deprive it of any real meaningful content, since it would include policies which have as 
their main or even exclusive objective, economic or social sectors other than the industry. 
However, the policies directed to the physical infrastructure are contemplated in this 
definition of industrial policies. And this for two basic reasons: a) because these policies 
need, essentially, the decisive action of broad segments of the industrial and service sectors 
to be carried out, contributing therefore, from the demand side, to the economic and, in 
many cases, technological performance of such sectors; and b) because of the impact that 
they have on these same sectors (and also on agribusiness) when considered from the 
perspective of infrastructure as input, i.e., when viewed from the standpoint of the costs and 
working conditions of the firms (that is to say, when analysed from the supply side). 
Parodying Johnson (1984a: 7), one could say that industrial policies are, together 
with fiscal, monetary and exchange policies  i.e., with what is generally recognised as 
economic policies  the fourth side of public policies, which should include, in the same way, 
agriculture (or nowadays, the entire agribusiness sector) and the social policies, that is, a 
fifth and a sixth component. 
 
3. The Impacts of Institutions over Industrial Policies 
 
It is important to stress, once more, that industrial policies are constituted of 
institutions, which implies the presence of strong relationships with the many other 
institutions in society, given the virtuous and/or vicious stability of the entire institutional 
edifice in which they are present and the interrelations among the various institutions 
(Jepperson & Meyer, 1991; Orrù et alii, 1991; Johnson, 1988; 1992). Hence, the creation 
or changing of some institutions implies dynamic (that is to say, through time) impacts, 
many of which unintentional, on a whole chain of more or less related institutions. These 
consequences, some of which are not foreseeable, occur also because of the feedback upon 
the institutions which are modified first and, subsequently, across the whole (or a good part 
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of  the)  set  of  institutions.  Moreover,  the  level  of  the  repercussions  is  differentiated 
according to the level of interrelation between the various institutions. For the creation of 
institutions and institutional transformation are conjugated with the totality of the structural 
evolution, or with a large part of it. Some of these institutional and structural mutations 
result from planned actions, others through happenstance. And it is impossible, unless if 
the most simplistic authors and models are followed, to predict all the consequences of 
premeditated structural and/or institutional changes.7 
 
The consequences of this are that any industrial policies in effective use at a specific 
moment, outside of any consideration about their efficiency, have important connections 
with several other (non) economic institutions, with some of these connections being 
stronger than others (Veblen, 1899; Abramovitz, 1986:388-90). So, new industrial policies, 
in order to be accepted in and adapted to a certain institutionality, need to be able to 
connect dynamically to the entire institutional structure and, above all, to those institutions 
more strongly related to them.8  Nevertheless, this does not mean that other countries will 
 
find it impossible to emulate institutions (industrial policies being amongst these) since 
many institutions can be emulated (sometimes with insignificant) adaptations. Regardless 
of what our opinion might be about the emulation of these institutions, world history, 
especially  that  of  recent  times,  provides  many  examples  of  such  events.  Thus,  with 
exclusive reference to economic institutions, it is possible to give examples almost at 
random, of the emulation of institutions by several countries in the areas of wages, work 
legislation, laws of limited responsibility, regulations of joint-stock companies, incentives 
through payment for productivity and/or profit bonuses, lifetime or part-time employment, 
the easing of regulations concerning worker dismissal, quality control circles, incentives for 
increased participation of employees in the firms where they work, etc. (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991). Furthermore, it is possible also to mention as examples of mainly or 
strictly non-economic institutions the emulation by several countries of republican, 
federalist, bicameral, etc., political systems; of transit laws; of the most different types of 
educational institutions (Noble, 1977; Brint & Karabel, 1991); of health institutions of 
various kinds, including hospitals, etc. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a; 1991b). Of course, 
 
7 Hirschman (1984; 1995); Popper (1963:150-1); Johnson (1988); North (1990). 
8  The industrial policies should also connect quite harmoniously with the other components of the societies 
(or social factors) interests, politics, ideology, and so on. 
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each of these institutions was little adapted to the anterior characteristics of the countries 
which imported them, and therefore had to acquire a certain local “flavour”.9 
However, it is certain that some institutions (including industrial policies) are more 
likely to emerge in and to conform to certain institutionalities, and are less likely to adapt to 
countries with much more diverse institutionalities than their places of origin.10 This is one 
of the (social) factors, together with ideologies, politics, interests, etc., which explains the 
great, at least in a explicit way, resistance, of certain countries (such as the Anglo-Saxon 
countries) to accept anticipatory industrial policies, whereas others (like the Asian countries 
as a whole, or the Continental Europe nations) do not face major problems following such 
types of policies, because their institutionalities are more adapted to them.11 
The same can be said of those nations that follow corporatist industrial policies, i.e., 
 
policies in which the harmonization of interests presents an enormous relevance. Thus, 
there are few countries which, currently, can assume corporatist policies without spending 
great  efforts  on  a  prior  construction  of  a  whole  set  of  institutions  (and  of  interests, 
 
9  This is one reason why arguments that many institutions could not be accepted and adapted to certain 
countries are simply disguises, in a great number of cases, for strong interests connected to the maintenance of 
old institutionalities (Chang, 1994a:88-9). As a matter of fact, such interests are responsible for making these 
arguments true. 
10 Johnson (1992:41). This would happen at least in quite stable situations, i.e., one without wars, revolutions, 
or foreign occupations, or any other more serious menace from abroad which could divert the institutionality 
of such countries from their previous path (Abramovitz, 1986:389-90). On the other hand, this resistance to 
transformations and/or the adherence to a senile institutionality can even put the survival of a nation at risk, as 
was demonstrated in the case of China, in the XIX century. Another example of fidelity to inefficient 
institutions is the case of Great-Britain during the II World War, when she risked her own survival as 
an  independent  nation.  That  country  excessively  delayed  a  thorough  re-equipping  of  her  armed 
forces, in order to keep her fiscal budget in “equilibrium”, while the Germans, in those times, were 
certainly not paying any consideration to such minor issues (Polanyi, 1944:240; Hayes, 1987). And, the 
same Great-Britain, after that war, remained attached to a set of equally old and obstructive institutions and 
interests. This resulted in an additional loss of her global importance (Blank, 1978; Zysman, 1983; Hall, 1986; 
Abramovitz, 1986:389-404). 
11 Anticipatory industrial policies are much more intrusive than reactive ones. They should also be 
comprehensive and integrated, aiming structural transformations and trying to anticipate the appearance of 
problems brought about by specific sector, economic  or social developments. Hence, such anticipatory 
industrial  policies  are in opposition  to reactive ones – those directed  to sectors in  decline or  facing 
difficulties. According to Gerybadze (1992:151-2,159-60), in the main industrialised nations, industrial 
policies have been increasingly active and anticipatory, i.e., directed towards what one figures the future will 
be, in opposition to the merely reactive policies, which are implemented after changes in relatively stable 
prior conditions. In this precise sense, one can register in the industrialised countries an increase in the 
policies directed to science and technology, whether executed alone or through international agreements 
(OECD, 1992a; Chesnais, 1994). The main explanation for such an increase in the use of technological 
policies, particularly of those with an international scope, is the perception of their great relevance for 
the long term performance of those countries. Thus, given the uncertainty which surrounds the results 
of R & D expenditures, different governments have been considering it profitable to pursue policies 
that stir up such expenditures. 
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ideologies, etc.) which are able to reinforce them (Katzenstein, 1984; 1985). For public 
policies, in corporatism, are a result of a never-ending series of trials and errors, which 
includes those involved in the building-up of an entire institutionality, and which on the 
basis of such attempts, achieves this reinforcement and can improve the whole through 
favourable individual decisions and results. 
As Katzenstein explains (1985:58), on corporatism 
 
“there are many small hands, many small blows, many mistakes and many corrections. 
This sort of response looks confused and disorderly. In an increasingly uncertain 
economic environment where rates of economic change are accelerating, however, the 
response is the small European states’ important contribution to the repertoire of modern 
capitalism.” 
 
This does not mean, as Katzenstein stresses, that it is impossible for larger countries 
(whether geographically or demographically determined) and/or with a very different 
institutionality from those of the corporatist countries which systematically resort to 
harmonization strategies, to learn and use several of the “techniques” practiced by these 
small countries (with the exception of Germany, which is a large country and has almost 
always made political agreements in the corporatist vein). Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
make a series of adaptations so that those nations not used to resorting to the harmonization 
of interests (that is to say, nations that do not use concertation schemes, which include 
representatives  from  almost  all  the  sectors  of  society)  are  able  to  benefit  from  the 
experience of corporatist countries. Logically, the carrying out of such a type of negotiation 
is more difficult in larger countries, due to the higher number of players and of interests 
involved. But, in such countries the agreements could, for example, be limited to a smaller 
number of aspects to concur upon, than in negotiations conducted in the smaller ones. 
Consequently, it should be clear that certain institutions give support to certain 
industrial policies, e.g., the ones referred to in the concertation of interests. However, it is 
important to emphasise that it is not only, or even primarily, the formalized institutions that 
are responsible for this support. Certain customs, non-written norms (besides the other 
social factors) allow specific societies to establish as a basic principle, for instance, the 
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inclusion of all or most of their inhabitants and/or citizens in the objectives pursued by 
these societies, while in other communities this does not happen.12 
It  is  also  important  to  notice  the  intertwining  of  these  formal  and  informal 
institutions with the ideology and interests which permeate such a “decision”, making it 
quite difficult, though still possible, to clearly separate institutions, ideology and interests. 
This is confirmed through the observation that societies, in their day-to-day existence, do 
not explicitly decide precisely the method by which they organise themselves or the 
objectives that they envisage. Instead they reach an unspoken agreement on such questions, 
which, then, generally appear (in a deceptive manner) to these societies as something 
“natural”, precisely because of this overlapping among institutions, ideologies, interests, 
politics, etc.13 Only in extraordinary conditions will such societies have to make significant 
decisions on their methods of social organization. And, chiefly in the case of countries 
which have had recent successes, there is often such a strong support for these sort of 
decisions  amongst  the  citizens  of  these  societies  (i.e.,  due  to  their  support  and 
understanding of prior decisions, ideologies, interests, forms of political harmonization, 
etc.)  that  efficient  forms  of  organisation14   emerge  as  almost  natural  to  these  citizens, 
whether they have been decided on individually or collectively. That is to say, these people 
can, in these circumstances, rely on a common resource of knowledge and experience 
which will appear to be both natural and logical. 
 
So, it should now be clear that each (of the above) type of institutionality is more 
capable of receiving, conceiving of or adapting to certain types of institutions (industrial 
policies among them). On the other hand, this does not imply that societies which are 
composed of such institutionalities could not incorporate elements from other 
institutionalities and, hence, improve themselves, even though these institutionalities are 
quite different from their own. This is especially the case when they notice that these new 
elements are essential to making positive transformations (at least from the perspective of 
 
 
 
12  Cf. Katzenstein (1984; 1985) for the distinctions between the kinds of corporatism of different countries, 
even with respect to the inclusion or not of foreigners (thus, inhabitants, but often not citizens) in the goals of 
harmonization. 
13  For societies almost never, or rarely, decide on a more radical change. They only maintain, by virtue of 
inertia, the way in which they organise themselves, whether it be efficient or inefficient. 
14  Or inefficient forms, in the case of societies that could not learn from past mistakes and/or from the 
examples of other societies, and in which such a learning process is made up by dysfunctional non-solutions. 
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international  competition,  given   that   there  is  also  competition  among  institutions 
 
Lazonick, 1992a). 
 
 
4. The Influence of Industrial Policies over Institutions 
 
On the other hand, the State frequently needs to create a new institutional structure 
for both society and economy or, at least, make some important institutional changes to that 
structure (Chang, 1994b:300), although this is clearly restricted to those institutions over 
which they can exert a more decisive influence. In this sense, the State itself is not hugely 
different from the private sector, if compared to that sector when it is in a phase of 
reshaping or generating new institutions or while it is trying to implement more radical 
changes.15  That is, the State, when trying to participate more actively in the destiny of a 
country, including in the fate of the economy, also often needs to promote institutional 
changes, even though they might be slight, in order to carry out its objectives.16  For 
instance, the State must frequently create new mechanisms of coordination for the various 
private and public agents, or even for the relations between these two types of agents, and 
also must generate new forms of protection for the society, the national firms, workers, etc. 
In reality, 
“[t]he establishment of a new coordination structure necessarily requires state 
involvement, even if the particular government in power does not want it. This is because 
only the state has the power to legalize (or at least give implicit backing to) the new 
property  rights  and  the  new  power  relations  (both  at  the  societal  level  and  at  the 
enterprise level), which provide an institutional reality to the new coordination structure. 
In other words, by giving the emergent coordination structure an institutional reality, the 
state will help agents with bounded rationality to establish quickly new organizations, 
new productive routines and new contracts which would enable them to deal with the 
‘new world’ with less informational burden. In this process of institutional building, the 
 
 
15  As, for instance, those changes which made possible the rapid and efficient diffusion of the (private) 
railways by the British, in the XIX century, even in foreign countries which received British investments; the 
Fordist mass production; the “Toyotist” lean production; etc. (Chang, 1994b:300.; Chandler Jr., 1990; Landes, 
1969; Lazonick, 1992a; 1992b; 1993; Womack et alii, 1990). It is important to observe that any modification 
or innovation in a rule, law, custom, etc., conforms to an institutional change. However, in this case I am not 
considering these small changes, but only the more radical ones. 
16  As Chang stresses (1994b:300): “This means that we [also] need to look at the role of the state as an 
institution builder.” 
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state is not merely responding to changes but also leading them, as it cannot grant 
property (and other) rights to people in a coherent way, unless it has a certain vision of 
what it regards as the desirable future…. In this sense, the state is both responding to and 
shaping the course of changes, as any good entrepreneur would do.”(Chang, 1994b:300). 
 
In a similar vein, the capacity of the State to avoid lock-ins in instrumentally 
inefficient processes should be emphasised, whether they refer to an unfavourable and 
premature institutionalisation of a determined technology or to the concentration of the 
institutional   arrangements   not   exactly   referring   to   techniques   in   certain   types   of 
“solution”.17 This outlining and setting up of institutions by the State can also make feasible 
the reduction of several transaction costs, by, for example, decreasing coordination costs to 
a level far below those of market solutions. In this case, the State can count on some 
support for its activities from those which are not in such a opposition of power and 
privilege that it would make them oppose any solution other than those of the market, i.e. to 
any solution that does not respect the current distribution of power and privilege (Chang, 
1994a:54; David, 1993b; 1994). 
On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasise that the fact that the State assumes 
such tasks does not necessarily mean that it will be able to execute them. This gives those 
agents who do not accept any intervention by the State in the economy some ground to 
stand on. However, there are certain pre-determined characteristics that could favour the 
success of the State in these activities, like the fact that it can represent the national and 
public interests, which may be a key element in certain situations.18 
 
Nevertheless,  many  authors  base  the  difficulties  which  the  State  faces  in  the 
carrying out of efficient industrial policies in underdeveloped countries precisely on the 
absence of adequate institutions to implement them, in opposition to the state of affairs in 
the developed nations. They indicate, as examples of these obstacles in the less developed 
 
 
17   In  this sense,  one  should  always remember  the  existence of  established  interests  contrary  to  certain 
institutional changes, and the search by the agents who represent these interests to direct these changes 
according to their will (David, 1985; 1987; 1993a; 1994; Chang, 1994b:300-1, n. 10). 
18 Chang (1994a:71). As an illustration, one could recall the implementation of recession cartels in Japan by 
some industries, after the oil price hike, in 1973/74: “In the case of the aluminium-smelting industry, one 
reason put forward for not cutting capacity to the level dictated by current relative prices... was the need to 
maintain a sizeable industry to support an R & D capacity, which is an important precondition for regaining 
international competitiveness if the cost situation improves in the future.”(Chang, 1994a:149,n. 27). Cf. also 
Torres Fo (1991). 
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countries, the absence of a sufficiently competent bureaucracy and the prevailing conflicts 
existent in many of the relations between State and private sector, which are also a 
consequence of the precariousness of the State and private institutionalities.19 Hence, based 
upon a line of argument with implicit institutionalist content, these authors underline the 
difficulties of “importing” institutions by those countries less institutionally and/or 
bureaucratically developed. For them, this factor alone would constitute an insurmountable 
obstacle to carry out efficient industrial policies, in spite of its potential positive results. 
However,  these  obstacles  should  not  be  exaggerated,  if  one  considers  that  the 
history of every country in the world has been marked by institutional emulation  from 
the copying of European institutions by the  Americans  and  the  Japanese,  in  the  XIX 
century, to the imitations in the opposite direction, in the XX century, or the emulation of 
Japanese institutions by many Asian countries, which have been taking place since the end 
of the 50’s/beginning of the 60’s. In many of these cases, as in several countries in East 
Asia, the process of emulation began, specifically concerning those institutions which were 
directed to industrialization and development, with a precarious institutionality as its base. 
So, in these countries a whole institutionality had to be created internally almost from 
scratch, by modelling the institutions on foreign ones. In this sense, it is important to 
mention the rapid institutional transformation made by the Newly Industrialized Countries 
(NICs) from southeast Asia  especially in the case of South Korea and Taiwan, but also of 
Hong Kong and Singapore  who had the explicit ends of industrial policy in mind, when 
they began to emulate Japanese institutions and industrial policies, from the end of the 
50’s until the beginning of the 70’s. Subsequently, the desire for development on the part 
of the new NICs from southeast Asia  e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand also lead these 
countries, at the beginning of the 80’s, to examine the results, institutions and policies of 
this initial set of PRIs, in order to set out on a similar path of efficient industrial and 
economic transformation. 
 
 
 
 
19  Chang (1994a:87). But, as Chang (1994a:152, n. 50) also points out, these characteristics are mainly 
underlined by the British scholars  who emphasise the conflicts between the State and the private sector  or the 
American ones  who, on the other hand, stress the relevance of a competent bureaucracy  thus taking with 
rather little awareness national problems as parameters for this “general” assertion. Cf. also Zysman (1983); 
Hall (1986) and Norton (1986). 
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But  certainly,  in  many  cases,  countries  can  create  their  own  institutions,  from 
original ideas or from certain previous institutional characteristics and/or historical events. 
For  example,  the  appearance,  at  least  in  the  big  companies  of  Japan,  of  lifetime 
employment, came into being after a series of strikes and serious workplace conflicts, 
immediately after World War II, and was not due to any time-honoured tradition (Johnson, 
1982:14; Chang, 1994a:87). The same happened with the keiretsus and the system of 
suppliers  subcontracting,  which  display  some  characteristics  of  the  pre-World  War  II 
period, but were enormously stimulated by a specific change during the war, still in the 
time of the zaibatsus. This change was the forced merger by the State of small and medium 
companies with big manufacturers of machinery and weapons, with the aim of increasing 
the efficiency of the whole Japanese productive system (Johnson, 1982:14). Something 
similar happened to the fast build up of a meritocracy system of workers recruited for the 
Japanese State in the XIX century. Such a system “perverted” some feudal traditions (thus 
institutions) and at the same time emulated, with due modifications, a great number of 
European and American institutions, in the Japanese effort to keep the country independent 
and modernize it, according to the technical and institutional vanguard of the time 
(Hobsbawm, 1977:164-71; 1994:201-2). 
In a similar vein, the heavy interventionism of the French State after World War II 
was a consequence of transformations in the elite which ruled that nation, and also a result 
of the humiliating defeat inflicted by the Germans (Monnet, 1976; Zysman, 1983), and not 
of a deep interventionist tradition. For, one should not forget that the French State was 
known, prior to that war, for its liberalism and anti-modernism (Chang, 1994a:87-8). And 
also the “traditional” and renowned Swedish welfare model, based on the concertation 
between labour and capital initiated with the transformations carried out in a very short 
period, had as its foundations some of the most contested industrial relations in 1920’s 
Europe, and also a enormous risk of seeing a Fascist regime ascending to power (mainly 
because of  the very high levels of unemployment at the  beginning of the 30’s –
Chang 1994a:88; Polanyi, 1944). 
 
On the other hand, the fact that a country may learn through the analysis of other 
competitors institutions and try to emulate their favourable characteristics absolutely does 
not mean that they want to copy the original institutions with complete fidelity, even if this 
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were possible (Orrù et alii, 1991; Chang, 1994a:88). Often it proves beneficial for these 
countries to preserve the institutions which  are performing quite  well,  and to only 
modify those which are somehow inefficient. For example, for practical purposes, the 
concertation policies of some of the smallest and most successful European countries, 
or even of Germany, have certain similarities to the lifetime employment system of the 
big Japanese companies, in terms of guaranteeing employment, which opens up the 
possibility of a positive attitude in relation to technical changes, despite the fact that 
the institutional employment structure of these various countries is completely diverse 
(Katzenstein, 1984; 1985). As Dore (1986) stresses, it is not necessary to absorb the 
Confucian ethic or to be as nationalist as many of the Japanese in order to emulate 
some of the advantages achieved by that nation after World War II,20  even if those 
 
ideologies seem attractive to some people. 
 
“‘[W]e should ask ourselves whether there are not other ways in which some of the 
things which Japanese institutions and traditions achieve for the Japanese might be 
obtained by other methods, other institutional arrangements, more consonant with our 
own [British] tradition. If close co-operation and consultation between managers and 
workers seems to be a precondition for rapid innovation in manufacturing firms, and if it 
is difficult to achieve this, given our adversarial traditions, what forms of industrial 
democracy or workplace decision-sharing might substitute for the easy acceptance of 
bureaucratic hierarchy which facilitates co-operation in Japanese firms? If we cannot 
have, and do not want, lifetime employment to be the norm, if we want to preserve a 
more mobile system with the greater personal freedom which that provides, can we at the 
same time devise schemes which could give British employers the same incentive to 
invest in training their employees as the lifetime employment expectation gives Japanese 
employers? If the crucial aspect of the Japanese system of financing industry seems to be 
the way in which it facilitates long-term planning and investment, and reduces 
preoccupations with next year’s bottom line, is there any way in which our own financial 
institutions could be mended to achieve the same effect, without necessarily 
modelling our stock exchange on Japan’s? If inflation control in Japan crucially 
depends on institutionalised wage leadership and a nationally simultaneous pay 
 
20 See also Fajnzylber (1983). 
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settlement  date,  does  that  not  suggest  the  wisdom  of  re-examining  the  many 
suggestions that have been made for introducing synchro-pay in Britain?’”(Dore, 
1986:252, apud Chang, 1994a:88-9). 
 
 
Hence, a country, when trying to emulate certain institutions, can try to adapt them 
to her pre-existing institutionality, i.e., to its “national particularities”. However, it will also 
try to make these institutions conform to the objectives of that country, which, in many 
cases, include the desire to avoid transplanting all the characteristics of another countries 
institutions or institutionality as a whole. Nevertheless, such a fact, does not imply that an 
institutional renovation will always succeed, for there will be instances in which the 
introduction of these new institutions will not be welcome. This would cause, for example, 
a lack of political support for such a transplant, even if it would only occur with 
modifications, or maybe the import may only be allowed in with such a large number of 
changes made to harmonise the new institutions to the old that a complete distortion of the 
emulated institutions will be brought about. That is why there are cases in which the 
copying of the institutions is not carried out and everything stops after the initial analyses, 
or  alternatively,  the  process  is  completed  only  after  significant  transformation  of  the 
original concept. 
This discussion makes us return necessarily to that of the “underdeveloped State”. It 
is important to understand that the underdevelopment does not only occur in the so-called 
productive sector (whether State or private owned), of certain countries or regions. On the 
contrary: it is accompanied, and also largely caused by a mainly unsatisfactory and 
underdeveloped institutionality, in which one shall include the institutions of the State that 
“commands” (or should “command”) the country under its rule (North, 1990). 
As a consequence any intention of carrying a development project requires the prior 
build up or profound restructuring of the institutionality of this underdeveloped State (if it 
is considered inefficient), in order that it may effectively direct the development process.21 
And this often also means the necessity of creating, or at least of directing, the private 
 
 
 
21 As we know, as one leave aside liberal speeches and pay attention to the real institutionality of the States in 
the developed countries, one notices that these States are also well developed  certainly with differences 
among the various countries, but never to the point which impedes the national governments from carrying 
out the public policies they want. This assertion is confirmed by the slow, but continual growth in the share of 
the public budgets in these countries GNP (OECD, 1989, 1992b) 
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institutions, in order that they better adapt to the objectives of development. It is obvious 
that, to realize such an intention, and even to negotiate the desired institutions, an efficient 
State, formed by an equally efficient institutionality is needed. This however, does not 
mean that the State cannot be built gradually. 
Therefore,  some  questions  almost  naturally  appear:  which  conditions  would  be 
those necessary to ensure the adequate success of far-reaching and dynamically efficient 
institutional changes? And, at the same time, which industrial policy decisions could create 
changes in institutions judged important for the very success of such a policy? 
As a matter of fact, one needs a whole set of factors (the social factors explained 
above: ideologies, interests, institutions, political support) that mutually reinforce each 
other,  in  order  to  surpass  a  determined  threshold  (a  critical  mass,  the  level  of which 
probably could never be scientifically established), on the basis of which the adoption of 
certain institutions and a certain institutionality acquire inevitability, and make a return to 
the  former  status  quo  impossible.  These  would  be  the  conditions  which  were  both 
necessary and adequate to the task of carrying out the project. But unfortunately these 
conditions are impossible to determine with precision, at least with the knowledge currently 
at our disposal. In the same vein, a set of factors is needed to assign certain characteristics 
to the designed institutions (including the industrial policies), to make them more 
instrumental (functional in relation to specific desired purposes). These factors would be 
worked out on the basis of these initially worked out transformations, but also on the basis 
of the complex interrelations between the several institutions and, in addition, on the basis 
of the relations among these institutions, the technical and structural conditions, and the 
various social factors that constitute societies (Veblen, 1899; Zysman, 1983:cap. 6). In this 
case, and in answer to the second question, there is the possibility of an efficient 
institutional change to occur. 
This set of factors which reinforce and correlate with each other, although in a 
uncertain way, imply an infinite possibility of combinations, making even more vain any 
attempt to determine exactly the values for the (partially) independent variables (since they 
are correlated) which would make possible the establishment of the exact value of the 
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dependent    variable    the  execution  or  not  of  industrial  policies  of  a  certain  type.22 
 
Furthermore, how can things such as political support, interests, ideology, institutions, etc. 
be quantified? 
Powell (1991:199) corroborates this assertion, describing with perspicacity the 
necessity of a whole set of interests, political support and ideologies that might allow the 
appearance or permanence of certain institutions and policies: 
“The influence of external pressures may be partial, inconsistent or short-lived. For 
example, government agencies, corporate sponsors, or community groups may have the 
influence to encourage the adoption of particular practices but lack the power to mandate 
them. In such cases, support for new politics may be strategic, that is, organizations will 
embrace them as long as it is in their own interest. Various collective actors, such as 
professional associations, trade associations, and other sources of reference group 
influence, may be able to promulgate ideas for change, but not require them. Similarly, 
government may legislate certain policies (such as equal opportunity employment), but 
leave the actual implementation of the policy unspecified. As a result, practices may 
become only weakly institutionalized. In each of these cases, practices that appear to 
have institutional support will have unequal staying power. As a result, policies may be 
introduced but not reproduced, or practices may take a firm hold for a short period, only 
to quickly wane when their source of normative support erodes.” 
 
Thus, this threshold or critical mass can be provided by the relative stress on the 
relevance and presence of any one of the social factors, or by mixing them “correctly” in 
the right proportions, i.e. according to certain minimum requirements for each of them. In 
these terms we may contemplate the importance which certain characteristics of some 
countries or regions assume, in the lead-up to a process of industrialization, as for example, 
the presence of a very nationalist and important group inside the Armed Forces in South 
Korea (Coutinho, 1999)   i.e., such a group also implies a particular combination of 
interests, nationalist ideology and political force   who mounted an  institutional structure 
 
22 As in a virtual graph with, say, six dimensions, one for each of the following “factors”: industrial policies, 
institutions, ideologies, politics, interests and historical moment (constituted by the material conditions 
of  a  country or region, at a  specific  moment,  to  which one  should  add  the  international  historical 
circumstances, all determining the developmental possibilities and the policies to which one can resort 
to when with that aim in mind). 
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appropriate to a rapid industrialization process, at a propitious moment in the international 
economy. 
This type of national elite and its accompanying ideology had equally an important 
role in other countries, as for instance in Brazil. However, in Brazil the political forces, 
ideologies, interests and the hegemony of this elite (whether or not its members were inside 
the State apparatus) were weaker than in South Korea, making its position less solid and 
therefore their interests and needs of a lower priority among the other interests of society as 
a whole. 
Bearing this in mind, certainly one can still try, in particular empirical situations, to 
make predictions on the values and the effective “weight’ of each one of the social factors, 
or on the whole set of them, but only with a great risk of these predictions being revealed 
ex-post as having been short of the reality. For it is only ex-post that one can know the 
“real weight” of each of the factors in the institutional or industrial development of a 
country. Nevertheless, even this knowledge will not be entirely objective, because of the 
aforementioned problems of analysis and/or quantification of so complex, multi- 
determined and interrelated factors, which are very familiar issues for instance to 
historians. It is this characteristic that causes so many mistakes in the predictions of 
social scientists (and economists are undoubtedly among them) and which by far 
outnumber the mistakes made by scientists from other areas, since the problems to be 
foreseen and/or explained (ex-ante and/or ex-post) are the result of an intricate 
relationship of innumerable variables, which are frequently not reproducible, not 
completely independent, and also correlated in an uncertain manner. 
Nevertheless, we still are left with the need to understand when these processes 
of institutional transformation occur historically. Although I do not intend in this short 
space  to  give  a  definitive  answer  to  such  a  complex  question,  I  hope  that  all  the 
elements presented and analysed so far may help us in this task. Thus, the multiple 
factors analysed in this paper may allow a better understanding of the great number of 
variables involved and off the impossibility of quantifying them, and also that these 
variables differ among the various countries.23 
 
 
 
23 This difference occurs even when such countries are quite near to each other, culturally or geographically, 
as, for instance, Denmark Sweden and Germany (Johnson, 1992:39). 
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Thus, on the basis of what has already been discussed in this article, the great 
difficulty or even impossibility of achieving institutional transformation lato sensu (that 
means, including formal and informal institutions) by means of a voluntaristic industrial 
policy, which is detached from a reasonable (but unquantifiable!) support of other factors, 
becomes evident. This voluntaristic industrial policy can even formally establish some 
institutions which are supposed to effectively support a developmental policy. But such 
institutions can be hindered (before or after their effective implantation, i.e., even after 
their initial discussions and presentations) by the other (formal and/or informal) institutions 
and by interests, ideology, politics, etc. (North, 1990; Powell, 1991:199). This does not 
mean that it will be impossible to make institutional transformations,24  but that it will be 
difficult  to  establish  the  right  timing  and  conditions  etc.,  for  the  establishment  of  an 
 
economic and institutional development cycle. It is likewise important to bear in mind that 
a mistake in this attempt to reform, even if only in relation to the timing, can lead to a 
stagnation, or worse still to a retrocession, because of the incitement and joining together of 
previously dispersed opposing interests, which in turn might lead to immobility, because of 
the fear of encountering potentially undesirable reactions. 
It is also important to underline the possibility that transformations which begin 
with economic, technical or institutional changes spread over other factors, as political or 
ideological ones, and then to interests, and so on. This can be a counterbalance to an 
excessive cautious stance, for relevant transformations in some variables may be essential 
in order to break the status quo. It is important to bear this in mind in order not to lose sight 
that changes in the institutional path can occur not only through modifications made in this 
same  institutions,  but  also  through  triggered  by  economic  and  technical  changes  (in 
production,   processing,   production   organization,   distribution,   marketing,   etc.)25    to 
 
transform  the  ruling  institutionality,  and  vice-versa  (Veblen,  1899;  Johnson,  1992), 
therefore making possible the breaking of the status quo. This is why it is so difficult to 
establish a general rule, which might determine with little margin of error, the possibility of 
 
24  In many cases the very developmental process, through the changes brought about in formal institutions, 
can also effect modifications, and in a desired direction, in an entire institutionality (now including informal 
institutions) and also in the other social factors. But in other cases, as in many examples of Latin America, 
this does not happen (North, 1990). 
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modifying societies or of the State providing the initial impulse to global changes in 
societal organization. 
The State might also be attentive to and take advantage of certain technological 
economic and/or institutional (in the wide sense given above) “windows of opportunity” 
(Perez, 1985; Perez & Soete, 1988), in order to start such transformations. These windows 
rarely provide the possibility of making radical changes in the path taken by a society 
(because, when they appear, they are not well utilized). In many cases, however, these 
windows at least allow for a small worthwhile deviation in the initial path, when the State, 
acting in the vanguard, or the society acting  autonomously,  takes  advantage  of  them. 
Thereafter the State may either escort the society or instead pick up the rearguard. 
It might be once more pointed out, that some of those opportunities are constituted 
of situations, “business” conditions and other social activities (like the interests, ideology, 
politics, etc.) which are all other than normal, and which serve to pull the society out of its 
usual inertia (Hirschman, 1995) and make it become, almost naturally, inspired by and 
predisposed towards transformations in institutions and other social components (including 
those concerning the “material conditions” of societies, i.e., the economy and technology). 
In fact, wars, invasions, revolutions, radical economic transformations, etc., cause such 
accentuated disturbances and such serious long term consequences in the societies where 
they happen, that it is almost impossible to return to the prior status quo after they end. 
Consequently, such types of event can lead to radical institutional changes, which allow the 
goals of sovereignty and the development of a country to be taken up again (Abramovitz, 
1986), if they had been relinquished (remember, once more, the French case, after World 
War II). On the other hand, in the cases where this does not happen, decline and complete 
subservience to another country(ies) seems inevitable. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this article, I tried to expose the complex relations between institutions and 
industrial policies. As we saw, institutions are, to a large extent, responsible for the slow 
changing of societies and their economies, and this represents an important fact to be 
 
25  Hence, innovations in the sense of Schumpeter (1942), whether they are radical or incremental. And that 
even if these innovations could be considered as such only for those countries which are trying to catch-up, 
i.e., if they are already widespread in the developed countries. 
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considered when seeking the implementation of industrial policies (and, perhaps, policies 
directed to other aspects of the economy and society, as for instance social policies). This 
becomes  clear  when  the  impacts  of  a  country’s  institutionality  over  the  choice  of 
determined industrial policies and the greater or lesser possibility of the success of these 
policies was explained. 
However, looking at the question from the opposite angle, this mutual influence can 
be equally examined from the perspective of the attempt made by industrial policy makers, 
to modify and/or to generate certain other institutions (perhaps copying them, even if only 
partially, from other countries) whether these institutions belong to the State, to the private 
sector or to the interface between this sector and the State. So, this paper has tried to show 
the relations between industrial policies and institutions from both points of view. 
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Abstract 
 
The paper aims to show some of the complex relationships between institutions and industrial policies. 
Institutions are important factors determining the slow pace of change of the societies, their economies, States 
and private sectors, therefore presenting important consequences for the design of industrial policies. Having 
this as a backdrop, the paper tries to expose the relevance of a country institutionality for the choice of 
industrial policies and their possibilities of success. In the opposite direction, one important focus for many 
industrial policies are institutional changes, whether they are connected to the State or to the relationship 
between the State and the private sector, or even only to this last sector. The paper also investigates some of 
the difficulties and limits for these institutional changes. 
